Developing Mode-Rich Satellite Software by Refinement in Event B by Iliasov A et al.
Newcastle University e-prints  
Date deposited:  10th September 2010 
Version of file:  Published [Newcastle University Computing Science Technical Report] 
Peer Review Status: Peer reviewed  
Citation for published item: 
Iliasov A, Troubitsyna E, Laibinis L, Romanovsky A, Varpaaniemi K, Ilic D, Latvala T. Developing Mode-
Rich Satellite Software by Refinement in Event B. Newcastle upon Tyne:School of Computing Science, 
University of Newcastle upon Tyne,2010. 
Further information on publisher website 
Publishers copyright statement: 
Use Policy: 
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced and given to third parties in any format or medium, 
without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not for profit 
purposes provided that: 
• A full bibliographic reference is made to the original source 
• A link is made to the metadata record in Newcastle E-prints 
• The full text is not changed in any way. 
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the 
copyright holders. 
 
 Robinson Library, University of Newcastle upon Tyne, Newcastle upon Tyne. 
NE1 7RU.   
Tel. 0191 222 6000 
COMPUTING 
SCIENCE 
Developing Mode-Rich Satellite Software by Refinement in Event B 
Alexei Iliasov, Elena Troubitsyna, Linas Laibinis, Alexander Romanovsky, Kimmo 
Varpaaniemi, Dubravka Ilic and Timo Latvala
TECHNICAL REPORT SERIES 
No. CS-TR-1207  June, 2010 
TECHNICAL REPORT SERIES
             
No. CS-TR-1207   June, 2010 
Developing Mode-Rich Satellite Software by Refinement in 
Event B 
A. Iliasov, E. Troubitsyna, L. Laibinis, A. Romanovsky, K. Varpaaniemi, D.  Ilic,  
T. Latvala 
Abstract 
To ensure dependability of on-board satellite systems, the designers should, in 
particular, guarantee correct implementation of the mode transition scheme, i.e., 
ensure that the states of the system components are consistent with the global system 
mode. However, there is still a lack of scalable approaches to formal verification of 
correctness of complex mode transitions. In this paper we present a development of 
an Attitude and Orbit Control System (AOCS) undertaken within the ICT DEPLOY 
project. AOCS is complex mode-rich system, which has an intricate mode-transition 
scheme. We show that re refinement in Event-B provides the engineers with a 
scalable formal technique that enables both development of mode-rich systems and 
proof-based verification of their mode consistency.
© 2010 University of Newcastle upon Tyne. 
Printed and published by the University of Newcastle upon Tyne, 
Computing Science, Claremont Tower, Claremont Road,
Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 7RU, England. 
Bibliographical details
ILIASOV A., TROUBITSYNA, E., LAIBINIS, L. ROMANOVSKY, A., VARPAANIEMI, K., ILIC, D., 
LATVALA, T. 
Developing Mode-Rich Satellite Software by Refinement in Event B  
[By]  A. Iliasov, E. Troubitsyna, L Laibinis, A. Romanovsky, K. Varpaaniemi, D. Ilic, T. Latvala 
Newcastle upon Tyne: University of Newcastle upon Tyne: Computing Science, 2010. 
(University of Newcastle upon Tyne, Computing Science, Technical Report Series, No. CS-TR-1207) 
Added entries
UNIVERSITY OF NEWCASTLE UPON TYNE 
Computing Science. Technical Report Series.  CS-TR-1207
Abstract
To ensure dependability of on-board satellite systems, the designers should, in particular, guarantee correct 
implementation of the mode transition scheme, i.e., ensure that the states of the system components are consistent 
with the global system mode. However, there is still a lack of scalable approaches to formal verification of 
correctness of complex mode transitions. In this paper we present a development of an Attitude and Orbit Control 
System (AOCS) undertaken within the ICT DEPLOY project. AOCS is complex mode-rich system, which has an 
intricate mode-transition scheme. We show that re refinement in Event-B provides the engineers with a scalable 
formal technique that enables both development of mode-rich systems and proof-based verification of their mode 
consistency. 
About the author 
Alexei Iliasov is a Researcher Associate at the Faculty of Computing Science of Newcastle University, Newcastle-
upon-Tyne, UK. He got his PhD in Computer Science in 2008 in the area of modelling artefacts reuse in formal 
developments. His research interests include agent systems, formal methods for software engineering and tools 
and environments supporting modelling and proof. 
E. Troubitsyna - a Professor at Aabo Akademi, Turku, Finland. Her main research interests are Formal modelling 
and verification methods; Design and verification of safety-critical systems;  Development and verification of fault 
tolerant systems;   Probabilistic verification;  Integrated modelling approaches; Service-oriented development 
and System architecture  
Linas Laibinis is a Senior Researcher at the Department of Information Technologies of Åbo Akademi 
University, Finland. He got his PhD in Computer Science in 2000 on mechanised formal reasoning about modular 
programs.  His research interests include interactive environments for proof and program construction, as well as 
application of formal methods to modelling and development of fault tolerant and distributed software systems. 
Alexander (Sascha) Romanovsky is a Professor in the CSR.  He received a M.Sc. degree in Applied Mathematics 
from Moscow State University and a PhD degree in Computer Science from St. Petersburg State Technical 
University. He was with this University from 1984 until 1996, doing research and teaching. In 1991 he worked as 
a visiting researcher at ABB Ltd Computer Architecture Lab Research Center, Switzerland. In 1993 he was a 
visiting fellow at Istituto di Elaborazione della Informazione, CNR, Pisa, Italy. In 1993-94 he was a post-doctoral 
fellow with the Department of Computing Science, the University of Newcastle upon Tyne. In 1992-1998 he was 
involved in the Predictably Dependable Computing Systems (PDCS) ESPRIT Basic Research Action and the 
Design for Validation (DeVa) ESPRIT Basic Project. In 1998-2000 he worked on the Diversity in Safety Critical 
Software (DISCS) EPSRC/UK Project. Prof Romanovsky was a co-author of the Diversity with Off-The-Shelf 
Components (DOTS) EPSRC/UK Project and was involved in this project in 2001-2004. In 2000-2003 he was in 
the executive board of Dependable Systems of Systems (DSoS) IST Project. He has been the Coordinator of the 
Rigorous Open Development Environment for Complex Systems (RODIN) IST Project (2004-2007). From 
February 2008 he will coordinate the FP7 DEPLOY Integrated Project (2008-2012). 
Kimmo Varpaaniemi, Dubravka Ilic and Timo Latvala are with Space Systems FInland. 
Suggested keywords
DEPENDABILITY 
FORMAL METHODS 
MODAL SYSTEMS 
Developing Mode-Rich Satellite Software by
Refinement in Event B
Alexei Iliasov1, Elena Troubitsyna2, Linas Laibinis2, Alexander Romanovsky1,
Kimmo Varpaaniemi3, Dubravka Ilic3, and Timo Latvala3
1 Newcastle University, UK
2 A˚bo Akademi University, Finland
3 Space Systems Finland
{alexei.iliasov, alexander.romanovsky}@ncl.ac.uk
{linas.laibinis, elena.troubitsyna}@abo.fi
{Dubravka.Ilic, Timo.Latvala, Kimmo.Varpaaniemi}@ssf.fi
Abstract. To ensure dependability of on-board satellite systems, the de-
signers should, in particular, guarantee correct implementation of the mode
transition scheme, i.e., ensure that the states of the system components are
consistent with the global system mode. However, there is still a lack of
scalable approaches to formal verification of correctness of complex mode
transitions. In this paper we present a development of an Attitude and Or-
bit Control System (AOCS) undertaken within the ICT DEPLOY project.
AOCS is complex mode-rich system, which has an intricate mode-transition
scheme. We show that refinement in Event-B provides the engineers with
a scalable formal technique that enables both development of mode-rich
systems and proof-based verification of their mode consistency.
1 Introduction
Currently the use of formal methods in the industrial practice is getting a new mo-
mentum. For instance, in the EU FP7 Integrated Project Deploy [15] the project
partners work on advancing methods and tools for refinement based-development
and verification by theorem proving. The goal of the project is to enable de-
ployment of these techniques in the industrial practice. Recently, Space Systems
Finland in cooperation with the academic partners has undertaken a formal devel-
opment of the Attitude and Orbit Control System within the Event B framework.
In this paper we present this development and discuss the lessons learnt.
The Attitude and Orbit Control System (AOCS) [8] is a generic component
of satellite onboard software. The main purpose of AOCS is to achieve and main-
tain optimal attitude of a satellite. While achieving it the system components
and the overall system correspondingly go through several stages – operational
modes. Modes – mutually exclusive sets of the system behaviour [11, 17] – form
a useful structuring concept that facilitates design of dependable systems in vari-
ous domains. AOCS is a a typical example of a mode-rich system with a complex
mode transition scheme. There are two distinctive characteristics that make AOCS
development and verification challenging. The first one is long running (i.e., non-
instantaneous) mode transitions that are caused by slow dynamics of the involved
electro-mechanical components. The second characteristic is an integration of er-
ror recovery with mode transition scheme, i.e., error recovery is implemented as
rollbacking to certain degraded modes. Together, these two features may lead to
cascading mode transitions, i.e., the situations when a system transition to one
mode is preempted by a transition to another (degraded) mode due to failure oc-
currence(s). It has been noted that testing and model checking of the systems with
such cascading mode transitions is difficult and suffers from poor scalability [21].
In this paper we demonstrate how to employ a correct-by-construction devel-
opment approach to circumvent this problem. We use the Event B framework [2,
19] (extended with modularisation capabilities [13]) as our modelling language.
The Rodin platform [23] and its modularisation plug-in [20] provide us with an
automated modelling and verification environment. We define a generic module
interface for mode-rich components and demonstrate how to create different mode-
managing AOCS components by instantiating the generic module. We develop the
system in a layered fashion, i.e., by gradually unfolding system architectural lay-
ers while proving consistency between mode transitions on adjacent layers. This
approach allows us to cope with complexity of AOCS.
We argue that the AOCS development presented in this paper is a successful
experiment in formal refinement-based development of a complex industrial size
system. Hence we believe that Event B extended with modularisation facilities
shows good potential for the use in the industrial practice.
2 Event B
We start by briefly describing our development framework. The Event B formal-
ism [3, 19] is an extension of the B Method [1]. The framework enables modelling
of event-based (reactive) systems by incorporating the ideas of the Action Systems
formalism [4, 5] into the B Method. Event B is actively used within the FP7 ICT
project DEPLOY to develop dependable systems from various domains. Event
B is a state-based formalism that promotes correct-by-construction development
paradigm and formal verification by theorem proving.
2.1 Modelling and Refinement in Event B
The Event B development starts from creating a formal system specification. The
basic idea underlying stepwise development in Event B is to design the system
implementation gradually, by a number of correctness preserving steps called re-
finements.
A simple Event B specification has the following general form:
MACHINE AM
SEES Context
VARIABLES v
INVARIANT Inv
EVENTS
INITIALISATION = . . .
E1 = . . .
. . .
EN = . . .
END
Such a specification encapsulates a local state (program variables) and provides
operations on the state. The operations (called events) can be defined as
ANY vl WHERE g THEN S END
where vl is a list of new local variables (parameters), the guard g is a state predi-
cate, and the action S is a statement (assignment). In case when vl is empty, the
event syntax becomesWHEN g THEN S END. The guard g defines the condi-
tions under which the statement can be executed, i.e., when the event is enabled.
The statement can be either a deterministic assignment to the variables or a non-
deterministic assignment from a given set or according to a given postcondition.
The non-deterministic assignments are of the form v : | Post(v, v′), where Post is
the postcondition relating the variable values before and after the assignment.
The INVARIANT clause contains the properties of the system (expressed
as state predicates) that should be preserved during system execution. The data
types and constants needed for modelling the system are defined in a separate
component called Context.
To check consistency of an Event B machine, we should verify two types of
properties: event feasibility and invariant preservation. Formally,
Inv(v) ∧ ge(v) ⇒ ∃v
′. Poste(v, v
′)
Inv(v) ∧ ge(v) ∧ Poste(v, v
′) ⇒ Inv(v′)
The main development methodology of Event B is refinement – the process
of transforming an abstract specification to gradually introduce implementation
details while preserving specification correctness. Refinement allows us to reduce
non-determinism present in an abstract model. The refined model can also contain
new variables and events. The connection between the newly introduced variables
and the abstract variables that they replace is formally defined in the invariant of
the refined model. For a refinement step to be valid, every possible execution of
the refined machine must correspond to some execution of the abstract machine.
The consistency of Event B models as well as correctness of refinement steps
should be formally demonstrated by discharging proof obligations. The Rodin plat-
form[23], a tool supporting Event B, automatically generates the required proof
obligations and attempts to automatically prove them. Sometimes it requires user
assistance by invoking its interactive prover. However, in general the tool achieves
high level of automation (usually over 80%) in proving.
2.2 Modelling Modular Systems in Event B
Recently the Event B language and tool support have been extended with a possi-
bility to define modules [13, 20] – components containing groups of callable opera-
tions. Modules can have their own (external and internal) state and the invariant
expressing properties on this state. The important characteristic of modules is that
they can be developed separately and then composed with the main system during
its formal development.
A module description consists of two parts – module interface and module
body. Let M be a module. The module interface MI is a separate Event B com-
ponent. It allows the user of the module M to invoke its operations and observe
the external variables of M without having to inspect the module implementation
details. The module interface consists of module interface description MI and the
context MI Context. The context defines the constants c, and sets s. The inter-
face description correspondingly consists of the external module variables w, the
external module invariant M Inv(c, s, w), and a collection of module operations,
characterised by their pre- and postconditions, as shown below.
INTERFACE MI =
SEES MI Context
VARIABLES w
INVARIANT M Inv(c, s, w)
OPERATIONS
res ← op1(par) =
PRE M Guard1(c, s, par, w)
POST M Post1(c, s, par, w, w’, res’)
. . .
END
Fig. 1. Interface component
A module development always starts with the design of an interface. Once an in-
terface is formulated and declared final, it cannot be altered in any manner. This
ensures correct relationships between a module interface and its body, i.e., that
the specification of an operation call is recomposable with an operation implemen-
tation. A module body is an Event B machine, which implements each operation
described in the module interface by a separate group of Event B events. Addi-
tional proof obligations generated to prove correctness of a module guarantee that
each event group faithfully implements the given pre- and postconditions of the
corresponding interface operation.
When the module M is ”included” into another Event B machine (the user of
M), the including Event B machine can invoke the operations of M as well as read
all the external variables of M.
To make a specification of a module generic, in MI Context we can define some
of constants and sets as parameters. The properties over the parameterised sets
and constants define the constraints that should be verified when the module is
instantiated. Once the parameters instantiated, they cannot be changed and no
further restrictions over them can be introduced.
The context in MI Context can also contain concrete (non-parameterised) con-
stants and sets. They should be fully defined when the interface is getting de-
scribed. In practice it means that we can merely define constants by introducing
symbolic names for certain values. Correspondingly the sets can be defined via the
full enumeration of its elements.
Module instantiation allows us to create several instances of the same module.
Obviously, different instances of a module operate on disjoint state spaces. Via
different instantiation of generic parameters the designers can easily accommodate
the required variations when developing components with similar functionality.
Hence module instantiation proves us with a powerful mechanism for reuse.
In the next section we demonstrate the use of Event B extended with modu-
larization capabilities in the development of AOCS.
3 Attitude and Orbit Control System
The Attitude and Orbit Control System (AOCS) is a generic component of satel-
lite onboard software, the main function of which is to control the attitude and
the orbit of a satellite. Due to a tendency of a satellite to change its orientation
because of disturbances of the environment, the attitude needs to be continuously
monitored and adjusted. An optimal attitude is required to support the needs of
payload instruments and to fulfill the mission of the satellite. For instance, the
attitude control may need to ensure that an optical system of the spacecraft is
oriented to cover the required area on the ground.
In general, the behaviour of AOCS is cyclic. At each iteration the sensors pro-
vide the control algorithms with various measurements. They are used to generate
the commands to the actuators that adjust the positioning of the spacecraft to en-
sure correct pointing of the payload instrument. AOCS consists of seven physical
components (called units): four sensors, two actuators and the payload instrument.
We formally develop the AOCS system as follows. Our initial specification
models the overall system in an abstract way. The following refinements introduce
implementation details in a structured manner, by unfolding system components
and gradually delegating part of system functionality to them. Moreover, we iden-
tify a generic template for such components in the form of a generic module in-
terface. Actual components will be introduced by instantiating this template, thus
formally decomposing the overall system in a structured and well-defined way.
3.1 Abstract Model
The purpose of the system is to position a satellite so that scientific instruments
are oriented towards particular region of Earth. At the most abstract level, we
capture this as a succession of two atomic steps: the preparation step, orienting
the satellite, and the activation step, initiating the instrument operation. Each
step is associated with a boolean flag. The system is in the preparation stage
when pr = FALSE, is in the activation stage when pr = TRUE ∧ act = FALSE
and, finally, it has activated the instrument when act = TRUE.
Whenever a non-recoverable error occurs (err = TRUE), the system enters a
permanently disabled state (until the underlying hardware platform is reset). It is
possible for the preparation step to be interrupted by a recoverable error. In such
situation, the preparation is restarted. In this abstract model this is depicted by
a non-deterministic action pr :∈ BOOL.
machine aocs
variables pr, act, err
invariant
pr ∈ BOOL ∧ act ∈ BOOL ∧ err ∈ BOOL
pr = FALSE ⇒ act = FALSE
err = TRUE ⇒ pr = FALSE ∧ act = FALSE
initialisation
pr, act, err := FALSE,FALSE,FALSE
end
preparation = when err = FALSE ∧ pr = FALSE then pr :∈ BOOL end
activation = when
err = FALSE ∧ pr = TRUE ∧ act = FALSE
then
act := TRUE
end
drift = when err = FALSE then pr, act := FALSE,FALSE end
error = begin err, pr, act := TRUE,FALSE,FALSE end
The model at this stage is just a simple state transition system. This is done
to portray the high-level properties of the system in clear and concise terms.
At some point, the aocs development is decomposed into two independent
strands. One focuses on unfolding of the functionality abstracted by the preparation
event. The other deals with activation of the scientific instruments by expanding
the activity event of the abstract model. To obtain two independent developments,
we show how to refine a machine into the composition of a refined machine and
a module. The composition with a module, while being a part of the refinement
process, is also a formal proof of a model decomposition. For the AOCS model, we
decompose the overall AOCS specification into a top level component (a refinement
of the aocs machine) and a subsystem in charge of the initialisation and control of
the positioning hardware. The subsystem is responsible for the positioning of the
satellite and the execution of necessary corrective actions.
To shorten the case study presentation, the decomposition is illustrated on the
basis of the abstract aocs machine.
3.2 Modal Component
To single out the preparation subsystem into a separate development, we start
by defining a module interface specifying the contract between the subsystem and
the environment. Let us note that derivations of this interface will be used several
times to structure the development into subsystems.
Our structuring strategy is to identify subsystems that are components of a
cyclic control system. As any control system, it observes environment changes
and controls the actuators. The control logic, though, is fragmented. Each such
fragment deals with a specific class of environment and subsystem conditions. In
our previous research, we have proposed to apply the notion of operational modes
in the formal development of such systems [14]. The essential idea is that a mode-
rich control system evolves in two dimensions: as a conventional control system
and as a mode transition system.
A mode can be seen is as an encapsulation of a piece of the control logic.
Hence, a mode transition is a change in the set of control laws. In such class
of systems, it is typical to have a mode comparing relation such that a ’better’
mode satisfies stronger constraints. While attending to its sensor/control/actuator
duties, a mode-rich control system also tries to progress towards a more advanced
mode. In the process of this it may encounter adverse environment conditions and
switch to a more basic (i.e., degraded) mode.
In this section we give the definition of a generic interface for mode-rich con-
trol systems. It is essentially a template that we will use several times in our
development.
The interface declares four variables (see Figure 2). The detected errors of
a component are modelled by the variable error. The remaining three variables
characterize the mode transitioning part of the component:
– last signifies the last successfully reached mode;
– next signifies the target mode that a component is currently in transition to;
– prev signifies the previous mode that a component was in transition to (though
it has not necessarily reached it).
These three variables describe the actual mode of a component and also the mode
transitioning dynamics. Based on the values of the variables, an environment is able
to tell whether the component has settled in a stable mode (last = prev ∧ next =
prev), is working towards a more advanced mode (last = prev ∧ prev 7→ next ∈
ORDER), or is degrading its mode due to an error recovery (next 7→ prev ∈
ORDER).
The operation ToMode can be called by an upper layer component to set a
new target mode. The operation ResetError is to clear the raised error flag when
the detected error is being handled. Finally, the operations Preparation and Con-
tinuation model the component behaviour when it receives the control while being
correspondingly in a stable or a mode transitional state.
The interface constants MODE, InitMode,ORDER,ERROR,NoError, which
are defined in a separate context component, contribute to abstract characteriza-
tion of the modal logic. MODE is a set of possible modes of a component, ORDER
is a relation containing all the allowed mode transitions, InitMode is a predefined
initial mode, ERROR is a set of component error, and NoError is a special value
denoting the absence of errors.
context Modal Context
constants MODE, InitMode,ORDER,ERROR,NoError
axioms
axm1 : InitMode ∈ MODE
axm2 : ORDER ∈ MODE↔MODE
axm3 : id ⊆ ORDER
axm4 : ORDER ∩ORDER−1 ⊆ id
axm5 : ORDER;ORDER ⊆ ORDER
axm6 : NoError ∈ ERROR
axm7 : ERROR \NoError 6= ⊘
end
The relation ORDER also defines a partial order on modes (axm3, axm4,
and axm5 express, correspondingly, the reflexivity, antisymmetry and transitivity
properties). For any two modes, it states whether the modes are comparable and,
if they are, which one of them is closer to the top mode (the maximum element).
3.3 Mode Manager Interface
The new subsystem introduced in the development is called Mode Manager. It
is a control system with its own set of modes and an internal mode transition
scenario. The Mode Manager interface is the product of extending the generic
module interface.
interface ModeManager extends ModalComponent
sees ModeManagerContext
interface ModalComponent
variables last, prev, next, error
sees Modal Context
invariant
inv1 : last ∈ MODE ∧ next ∈ MODE ∧ prev ∈ MODE ∧ error ∈ ERROR
inv2 : next = prev =⇒ next = last
inv3 : next 6= prev ⇒ next 7→ prev ∈ ORDER ∧ prev 7→ next ∈ ORDER
inv4 : {last 7→ prev, last 7→ next} ⊆ ORDER ∪ORDER−1
initialisation
last, prev, next := InitMode, InitMode, InitMode
error := NoError
operations
r← ToMode = any m pre
error = NoError ∧m ∈ MODE
m 6= next ∧m 7→ next ∈ ORDER ∪ORDER−1
post
r′ = last ‖ prev′ = next ‖ next′ = m
end
r← ResetError = pre error 6= NoError post r′ = last ∧ error′ = NoError end
r← Preparation = pre
next = prev ∧ error = NoError
post
r′ = last ∧ error′ ∈ ERROR
prev 7→ next′ ∈ ORDER ∪ORDER−1
end
r← Continuation = pre
next 6= prev ∧ error = NoError
post
r′ = last
(last′ 7→ next ∈ ORDER ∪ORDER−1∧
next′ = next ∧ prev′ = prev)∨
(next′ = next ∧ prev′ = next∧
last′ = prev′)
error′ ∈ ERROR
end
end
Fig. 2. Generic Modal Component interface.
More specifically, the set of modes and the mode ordering relation are given
concrete definitions at the interface level. The following is the definition of the
Mode Manager context.
context ModeManagerContext
. . .
axioms
iaxm1 : MODE = {OFF, STANDBY, SAFE,NOMINAL,PREPARATION, SCIENCE}
iaxm2 : Scenario = {OFF 7→ STANDBY, STANDBY 7→ SAFE, SAFE 7→ NOMINAL,
NOMINAL 7→ PREPARATION,PREPARATION 7→ SCIENCE}
· · ·
iaxm3 : Scenario ⊆ ORDER ∧ ORDER; Scenario ⊆ ORDER
iaxm4 : (∀z · Scenario ⊆ z ∧ z; Scenario ⊆ z ⇒ ORDER ⊆ z)
iaxm5 : OFF = InitMode
iaxm6 : partition(ERROR, SoftError,HardError, {NoError}}
iaxm7 : SoftError 6= ⊘ ∧HardError 6= ⊘
In the above, Scenario defines the sequence of steps needed to bring the sys-
tem to the mode where the scientific payload instrument is ready to perform its
tasks. This sequence consists of the following modes: Off - the satellite is in this
mode right after system (re)booting; Standby - this mode is maintained until the
separation from the launcher is completed; Safe - the satellite acquires a stable
attitude, which allows the coarse pointing control; Nominal - the satellite is trying
to reach the fine pointing control which is needed to use the payload instrument;
Preparation - the payload instrument is getting ready after fine pointing is reached;
Science - the payload instrument is ready to perform its tasks. The mission goal
is to reach this mode and stay in it as long as needed.
Note that Scenario is merely a helper construct used to constrain the ORDER
relation.
First Refinement To integrate Mode Manager with the main development, the
(instantiated) Mode Manager interface is included into a refinement of the abstract
aocs machine. We omit the intermediate steps bringing the main development
conceptually closer to the point of integration and demonstrate the integration as
an immediate refinement of the machine aocs.
The refined machine aocs1 imports the moduleModeManager and thus has the
read access to the module interface variables. The first step in a decomposition
refinement is to link the state of aocs1 with the state of an imported module. In
our case, the link is quite strong. In fact, we able to replace the abstract variable
pr with an expression on module variables.
refinement aocs1
refines aocs
uses ModeManager
invariant
inv1 : error = NoError⇒ err = FALSE
inv2 : pr = bool(next = last ∧ last = SCIENCE)
. . .
end
In the model fragment above, inv1 states that when there is no subsystem-level
error there is also no global error. Intuitevely, it means that the Mode Manager
component is currently the only source of errors (though some errors may be
tolerated). inv2 expresses a connection between the modal logic of Mode Manager
and the state of preparedness of the abstract model. Here we simply state that the
preparation is complete once Mode Manager has reached the Science mode.
The second step of decomposition is the integration of the Mode Manager oper-
ations into the functionality of the top-level component. The abstract preparation
event is refined into a pair of events.
mode advance ref preparation = when
error = NoError ∧ last 6= SCIENCE
last = prev
then
Preparation
end
intermediate ref preparation = when
error = NoError ∧ last 6= SCIENCE
last 6= prev
then
Continuation
end
Here Preparation and Continuation use a shortcut notation for an operation
call where the return value is ignored. Both events refine preparation and use
subsystem operations to advance the model state. The events try to accomplish
the same goal – reach the mode SCIENCE. The first one is enabled when Mode
Manager is in a stable mode, while the second addresses the case when a mode
transition is on its way. These events do not assign to the aocs variables and thus
this part of the system functionality is completely delegated to the Mode Manager
subsystem.
The other group of events deals with error conditions. The Mode Manager in-
terface distinguishes unrecoverable and recoverable errors. Sometimes, the system
would simply remove an error, treating it as recoverable one. This an abstraction
of the error handling activity at this level. In some cases, to recover from an error,
it may be necessary to reconfigure the Mode Manager component. This happens
when there is a malfunction in some hardware unit and, as a result, the unit must
be switched off to put the system into a healthy state. Since the failed unit is no
longer available, the Mode Manager mode is downgraded to some degraded mode
where the system does not need the services of the failed unit. Since the system is
cyclic, once the error is cleared, the preparation would restart and would attempt
to switch on and initialise the failed unit. Our modelling assumption here is that
this is often sufficient to repair the failed unit.
recovery = when error ∈ SoftError then ResetError end
drift = any m where
m 7→ next ∈ ORDER−1
error 6= NoError
then
ResetError
ToMode(m)
end
error = when error ∈ HardError then err := TRUE end
3.4 Mode Manager
Let us now consider the Mode Manager development. It starts with an Event B
machine implementing the Mode Manager interface. For each interface operation,
there is one event group realising the operation. Some groups events are final
designating the group exits point – the terminal events returning the control to
the calling environment. An event that is not final must pass control to another
event in the same event group. The following is an excerpt from the abstract
machine of the Mode Manager development.
machine MMBody
implements ModeManager
. . .
group Continuation begin
final adv skip = when next 6= prev then error :∈ ERROR end
final adv partial = any m where
next 6= prev
m ∈ MODE ∧m 6= next
m 7→ next ∈ ORDER ∪ORDER−1
then
last := m ‖ error :∈ ERROR
end
final adv comp = when
next 6= prev
then
error :∈ ERROR ‖ last := next ‖ prev := next
end
end
. . .
end
The Continuation operation is realised by a group containing three events. The
event adv skip models the behaviour when no mode change happens during the
call. This needed to model mode transitions that take substantial time and thus
are spread over several control cycles. A transition to some intermediate mode is
modelled by adv partial. Intermediate modes are observed when a component is
progressing to some mode that is not reachable directly from the current mode.
Finally, adv comp specifies when the system successfully reached the target mode
(and thus arrived to a stable state).
Mode Manager does not directly control the satellite hardware. Instead it relies
on a special subsystem, called Unit Manager. The purpose of Unit Manager is to
abstract the specifics of a hardware configuration and provide a simple common
control interface to the hardware. We approach Unit Manager design as another
instance of a mode-rich control system.
Unit Manager Interface The Unit Manager interface is a specialisation of the
generic interface defined in Figure 2. Like Mode Manager, it defines its own set of
modes and a mode transition scenario.
interface UnitManager extends ModalComponent
sees UnitManagerContext
The Unit Manager modes define the positioning algorithms and are closely
related to the set of hardware units involved in computing the positioning com-
mands. The modes NAV EARTH and NAV SUN use crude algorithms based on
the input from the Earth and Sun sensors. NAV ADV and NAV FINE use the
GPS unit to compute the satellite position in respect to the Earth surface. The
mode NAV INSTR is the final target mode meaning that the scientific instrument
hardware is enabled.
context UnitManagerContext
. . .
axioms
uaxm1 : MODE = {OFF,NAV EARTH,NAV SUN,NAV ADV,
NAV FINE,NAV INSTR}
uaxm2 : Scenario = {OFF 7→ NAV EARTH,OFF 7→ NAV SUN,
NAV EARTH 7→ NAV ADV,NAV SUN 7→ NAV ADV,
NAV FINE 7→ NAV INSTR}
end
Unit Manager Integration After a number of refinement steps, the Mode Man-
ager development is decomposed to separate the Unit Manager development. The
link between the two developments is quite tight. Mode Manager relies on Unit
Manager in the most of its operations as Mode Manager does not have a direct
access to the controlled hardware. The required mode consistency between these
components is defined as a a relation linking the modes of Mode Manager and
Unit Manager. Moreover, the added invariant properties (in the Mode Manager
model) guarantee that the modes of two components are always in agreement with
each other.
The mode mapping relation is defined as the constant um mode under the
USES clause. To avoid name clashes, the Unit Manager module is instantiated
with the prefix um. Consequently, all the names imported from the module appear
with the prefix.
machine MMBody3
. . .
uses um : UnitManager
constants um mode
axioms
um mode = {OFF 7→ um InitMode, STANDBY 7→ um InitMode,
SAFE 7→ um NAV EARTH, SAFE 7→ um NAV SUN,
NOMINAL 7→ um NAV ADV,PREPARATION 7→ um NAV FINE,
SCIENCE 7→ um NAV INSTR}
. . .
invariant
. . .
gi1 : next = prev ⇒ last 7→ um last ∈ um mode
gi2 : next = prev ⇒ next 7→ um next ∈ um mode
gi3 : next = prev ⇒ prev 7→ um prev ∈ um mode
gi4 : async = FALSE ∧ um error 6= um NoError =⇒ error 6= NoError
. . .
end
The gluing invariants define the correspondence between the Mode Manager
and Unit Manager modes and errors. All the events of Mode Manager must main-
tain this correspondence. As a result, an update of the Unit Manager mode often
necessitates an update of the Mode Manager mode.
The Unit Manager development, in its turn, is split into the main control
part and a number of subsystems modelling individual hardware units. Each such
subsystem follows the same modelling pattern and starts with a version of the
generic Modal Component interface. However, unlike Mode Manager and Unit
Manager, the hardware units are not a part of the control logic we are developing.
Collectively, the units define the environment of the system and and thus are only
characterised by their interfaces.
3.5 Unit Interface
The hardware unit subsystems differ by their set of modes and mode transitions
rules. Each one also define its own set of error conditions. Instead of defining an
extended interface for each individual unit we use a single parameterised interface.
Consequently, unit modes and mode transitions are specified at the point of module
integration.
interface UnitComponent extends ModalComponent
parameters MODE, InitMode,ORDER,ERROR,NoError
In the specific hardware configuration that we are modelling there are six hard-
ware units. To construct a faithful model close executable program, we explicitly
introduce each unit subsystem by importing the (correspondingly instantiated)
generic interface.
4 Lessons Learnt
AOCS described in this paper is a modified (due to confidentiality reasons) version
of a realistic AOCS. The real system was developed by Space Systems Finland some
time ago using traditional development approaches. The company has observed
that verification of the AOCS mode transitions via testing was quite difficult and
time consuming. This has prompted the idea of experimenting with a formal AOCS
development to ensure correctness of mode transitions.
The initial attempt [24] to formally develop a system was rather unsuccessful.
This modelling was significantly influenced by the code that was developed for the
real AOCS. It started from modelling the overall control cycle that consisted of a
sequence of events abstractly modelling the entire system structure and functional-
ity – the mode manager, the unit manager and fault tolerance mechanisms. Then,
in the further refinement steps, we had to introduce a large number of variables and
events (modelling program counters and procedure calls) to continue representing
interdependencies between the system components and functions. Moreover, at
the time of this development, Event B was still lacking modularization support.
As a result, fairly soon the developed monolithic model became unreadable for
the developers and unmanageable for the Rodin platform. We concluded that the
further development would be quite problematic.
Apart from some technical issues that had to be resolved in the Rodin platform,
we have learnt the following main lessons:
– Support for modularisation is absolutely necessary to enable scalable formal
development of complex industrial systems in Event B;
– The development should support architectural-level modelling and allow us to
express logical interdependencies between the system level components in a
succinct way;
– It is important to maintain readability of models.
The next development attempt [12] was preceded by a preparatory work that
aimed at alleviating discovered problems. We have developed a modularisation
plug-in [20] implementing the modularisation extension for Event-B that we have
proposed previously [13]. Moreover, while formalizing reasoning about mode-rich
systems [14], we developed a pattern for specifying mode-managing components.
However, probably most importantly, before starting the development as such, we
drafted a refinement strategy. Our strategy was to build the system model in a
hierarchical layered fashion via instantiation of generic modules. This approach
indeed demonstrated its viability.
The second development attempt – the one which is described in this pa-
per achieved the desired goal. We succeeded in building a detailed AOCS model
and verified (by proofs) that it correctly implements the desired mode transition
scheme. The development was performed in a structured way, where the levels of
abstraction corresponded to the architectural layers. While performing a refine-
ment step, we unfolded the architectural layers and established the consistency of
mode transitions between adjacent layers as a part of refinement verification. The
specifications of components were produced as a result of instantiating the generic
module interface that is common for mode managing components on different
layers of abstractions.
Refinement by instantiating the generic components significantly simplified the
development and proof activity. As a result, we have alleviated the problem of
manipulating large monolithic models. The produced models of modules (com-
ponents) are much smaller. They are also easier to understand and verify. The
overall system model is also rather compact and can be easily maintained because
it includes only references to the components visible state and interface.
In our development we have made a smooth transition from the architectural
modelling to modelling the detailed behaviour of each particular component. The
properties of generic module parameters determine the constraints on concrete
data structures that should be proved during module instantiation. Our mechanism
of module instantiation and then subsequent development (refinement) of a module
ensures that these constraints are satisfied by module implementation.
The layered development has also facilitated modelling and verification of the
system fault tolerance mechanisms. The hierarchical architecture allowed us to
distribute the responsibilities of error handling across the different layers, which
resulted in a well-structured implementation of the fault tolerance mechanisms.
The main lessons that we have learnt from this development are the following
– It is important to have a strategy of the development - a certain refinement
plan that is drafted before the real development commences;
– It is beneficial to refrain from modelling major design decisions in the initial
specification since it can significantly complicate the later development;
– Modularisation support is paramount in modelling large scale systems;
– Without a mature tool support a formal development of industrial systems is
infeasible.
5 Related Work
Formal validation of the mode logic and, in particular, fault tolerance mechanisms
of satellite on-board software has been undertaken by Rugina et al [21]. They have
investigated different combinations of simulation and model checking. In general,
simulation does not allow the designers to check all execution paths, while model
checking often runs into the state explosion problem. To cope with these problems,
the authors had to experiment with various combinations of these techniques as
well as heavily rely on abstractions and simplifications. Our approach is free from
these problems. Firstly, it allows the developers to systematically design the system
and formally check mode consistency within the same framework. Secondly, it
enables exhaustive check of the system behaviour without running into the state
explosion problem. Hence our approach can potentially give the developers better
confidence in the correctness of the obtained design.
The mode-rich systems have been studied to investigate the problem of mode
confusion and automation surprises [6, 11, 22]. These studies conducted retrospec-
tive analysis of mode-rich systems to spot the discrepancies between the actual
system mode logic and the mental picture of the mode logic that the human user
might have. Most of the approaches relied on model-checking [6, 11, 22], while [7,
16] relied on theorem proving in PVS. Our approach focuses on designing fully au-
tomatic systems and ensuring their mode consistency. Unlike [11], in our approach
we also emphasize the complex relationships between system fault tolerance and
the mode logic.
In our previous work [9], we have studied a problem of specifying mode-rich
systems from the contract-based rely-guarantee perspective. These ideas have been
further applied for architecting fault tolerance modes [18]. According to this ap-
proach, a mode-centric specification of the system neither defines how the system
operates while it is in some specific mode nor how mode transitions occur. It rather
imposes restrictions on concrete implementations. Such an approach complements
traditional modelling but does not replace it. In this paper we have taken a dif-
ferent – an integrated – view and demonstrated how to combine reasoning about
the system mode logic and its functioning.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we described formal development of the AOCS system by refinement
in Event-B. The attempted case study has shown that the Event B framework and
the supporting RODIN platform have sufficiently good scalability. Our approach
facilitated creating a clean system architecture and also allowed us to make a
smooth transition from the architectural-level system modelling to specification
and refinement of each particular component. Moreover, refinement-based devel-
opment techniques coped well with modelling the complex mode transition scheme
and verification of its correctness.
Verification of all possible mode transitions (including complex cascading ef-
fects) was done by proofs and did not require any simplifications. Currently that
level of assurance cannot be delivered neither by model-checking, simulation or
testing alone nor by combination of these techniques. The proposed modularisa-
tion and stepwise development style allowed us to keep manual proof efforts at a
reasonable level (about 17 percent of proofs had to be carried out interactively).
Hence formal verification by theorem proving has become more accessible for in-
dustry practitioners.
In the presented work we aimed at not merely experimenting with modelling
a particular industrial-size system in Event B, but rather at creating a generic
solution facilitating development of AOCS-like systems. Indeed, our approach to
modelling mode-rich components using generic instantiation supports both reuse
and composition. Such reuse is safe, since while developing a component by refine-
ment we formally ensure its conformance to the instantiated specification of its
interface. Moreover, it becomes manageable to verify composition of components
whose state and behaviour are succinctly formally modelled.
Our work can be seen as a step towards creating a formal approaches for
model-driven development and establishing the reference architecture for the space
sector – the two recent initiatives of European Space Agency [10]. As a future
work it would be interesting to connect our approach to the languages specifically
dedicated to architectural modelling. Moreover, it would be useful to continue
experimenting with formal modelling of various types of architectures of mode-
rich systems as well as address the problem of ensuring mode consistency in the
presence of dynamic reconfiguration.
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